Thursday, November 29, 2007

Dean M Roberts-criminal


CIVIL COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK : HOUSING PART
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KENMORE ASSOCIATES, L.P. & : Index # 071507/07 &
HOUSING & SERVICES INC. & Norris : Index # 52851/06
McLaughlin & Marcus :
Petitioner, : AFFIDAVIT
: JURY DEMAND
Tenant, :
:
Respondent. :
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State of New York)
(County of New York)
SS: I,____________________, (Tenant ), Respondent in this Action, being duly
sworn, hereby depose and state: That the Court (The Honorable Kevin McClanahan), Hearing
Officer or not (see Att. Met Council v. Crosson), has releases itself from Judicial Immunity by
operating outside its Jurisdiction (Federal) as well as without Personal Jurisdiction over
Respondent. Bias was evidenced in both appearances (see Transcripts) and see following:
"Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction."
Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872).
Pulliam v. Allen (1984) 466 U.S. 522, the Supreme Court Justices held:
There is little support in the common law for a rule of judicial
immunity that prevents injunctive relief against a judge. There is
even less support for a conclusion that Congress intended to limit the
injunctive relief available under § 1983 in a way that would prevent
federal injunctive relief against a state judge.
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 US 547, 18 L Ed 2d 288, 87 S Ct 1213
(1967), the Court found no indication of affirmative congressional
intent to insulate judges from the reach of the remedy Congress provided
in Section 1983. Nothing in the legislative history of § 1983 or
in this Court􀀂s subsequent interpretations of that statute supports a
conclusion that Congress intended to insulate judges from prospective
collateral injunctive relief.
Congress enacted § 1983 and its predecessor, § 2 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat 27, to provide an independent avenue for
protection of federal constitutional rights. The remedy was considered
necessary because “state courts were being used to harass and
injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to
stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon
abrogation of federally protected rights.” Mitchum v Foster, 407 US 42
225, 240, ... (every member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed
that judges would be liable under 􀀁§ 1983).
Subsequent interpretations of the Civil Rights Acts by this Court
acknowledge Congress􀀂 intent to reach unconstitutional actions by
all state actors, including judges. ... Judicial immunity is no bar to
the award of attorney􀀁s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Citing Pulliam v. Allen (1984) 466 U.S. 522, the Ninth Circuit held in
Dykes v. Hosemann, 743 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984):
It is clear that a judge who acts in the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction may be held liable for his judicial acts. Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall.335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). ... The rationale for this
limitation on judicial immunity is set out in Bradley v. Fisher and reiterated
in Stump v. Sparkman: “Where there is clearly no jurisdiction
over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority,
and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction
is known, no excuse is permissible.”
An absence of personal jurisdiction may be said to destroy “all
jurisdiction” because the requirements of subject matter and personal
jurisdiction are conjunctional. Both must be met before a court
has authority to adjudicate the rights of parties to a dispute.
If a court lacks jurisdiction over a party, then it lacks “all jurisdiction”
to adjudicate that party􀀁s rights, whether or not the subject
matter is properly before it. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84 ... [i]t has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing
a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered
only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant”)
(citations omitted) ... Because the limits of personal jurisdiction
constrain judicial authority, acts taken in the absence of personal
jurisdiction do not fall within the scope of legitimate decision
making that judicial immunity is designed to protect. See Gregory v.
Thompson, 500 F.2d at 63. We conclude that a judge who acts in the
clear and complete absence of personal jurisdiction loses his judicial
immunity.
Because the issues of whether Judge Hosemann knew he lacked
personal jurisdiction or acted in the face of clearly valid statutes or
case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction are matters for initial
determination in the district court, we reverse the order dismissing
the claim against Judge Hosemann and remand to the district
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The issue raised in the instant action, that also requires a jury trial,
is whether the defendants knew that they, and the lower court judges,
that they were (1) acting without jurisdiction; and (2) whether they
knew that they, and the other judges they protected, were acting in
the face of clearly valid statutes, case law, and federal question
rights. A jury trial is required on this basis alone.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 241 Conspiracy against rights of citizens. If two or
more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in
the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
the same; ... They shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both;
Additional relevant Law and Case Law:
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343,Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title 42 USC § 1985, 28 U.S.C. § 144
28 U.S.C. § 455, United States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979), Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 2, New York Judiciary Law §14, State and Federal due process rights to a neutral and
detached jurist, to a fair hearing, and to the right to confront the witnesses against them (see, NY
Const, art I, § 6; US Const 6th, 14th Amends), Johnson v. District Court, 674 P.2d 952 (1984),
Rules of the Chief Administrator §100.3(E) (a) (i) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party;
Respondent continues to deny Personal Jurisdiction due to Specific Denial of Receipt and
Demands continued Special and/or Limited Appearance status. Jury Trial Demand is as of Right
(see Att. Motion to Stay) and it is within the power of a Just Court to grant Trial on the Instant
Motion (CPLR §2218).
As to Motion to Recuse, the obvious bias by the court (Hon. Kevin McClanahan), on the record,
("He's really weird FOR A TENANT (lines 3 etc.)) show a hatred for tenants in general and this
Respondent in particular, either for reasons of Race, Ethnicity, Creed, Sex, Age and/or (partial
(Photophobia & Myopia)) Disability. Judge and/or Hearing Officer McClanahan is perhaps
unaware that this Court has no Jurisdiction over Federal Constitutional Claims, Federal Law, or
Federally owned property, which was not disputed by petitioner. Pending Complaint before the
Commission on Judicial Conduct and issues before Appellate Term, First Department are
additional grounds for Mandated Recusal of the Court.
As to Motion to Clarify Hearing Officer versus Judicial Authority see attached (Met Council v.
Crosson 84 N.Y.2d 328, 642 N.E.2d 1073, 618 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1994).
As to Motion to Dismiss for violation of CPLR § 2214, petitioner failed to respond to lawfully
served original Omnibus Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice in a timely manner and thus was/is in
default. As to Defective Petition, It was not signed, as all Court Papers are required to be (CPLR
§ 2101 (see Boyd v. Kellman, 225 5th LLC v Fiori Fiori Inc., NYLJ, Feb. 16, 2005, at 22, col 3 (Civ
Ct, NY County, Gesmer, J.).). Petitioner was noticed of this defect within two days of improper
service as required (see att.).
As to Motion to Dismiss for failure to include other Parties (CPLR § 3221(a)10), due to Section
8 status (att.), agreement between petitioner and HUD and Section 8 "lease rider". No
Certification procedure compliance (see the Williams consent decree).
As to Motion to Renew/Reargue Respondent again points to lack of Personal and Actual
(Federal) Jurisdiction over this case. Case # 52651/06 is still active and not off calendar. Plaintiff
failed to answer Omnibus Motion in unsigned "affirmation" in Opposition or in Court and thus
must be deemed stipulated to (see Motion to Stay). Respondent believes Vacatur of lawful
Stipulation (July 5, 2007) between parties lacks legal Authority and/or reason.
As to Motion to Dismiss for defective Predicate Notice, it was not signed by "landlord" or
petitioners counsel but by petitioners Debt Collector (see 8201 Realty Assoc. v. Navas).
As to Motion to Compel, Respondent, in the Interest of Justice and Federal and State Due
Process Rights, Demands sufficiently before trial to prepare, Plaintiff(RICO)'s witness list, any
Documentary and/or other evidence to be introduced at trial, and a Reply to Lawfully served
Answer.
As to Motion for Change of Venue, Respondent Demands that case(s) be moved to SDNY
Federal Court , as Court of Proper Jurisdiction, at Petitioner's expense. This need is evidenced by
all Federal Laws, U.S. Constitutional Defenses, and Unrebutted Federal Ownership Allegation
included in all respondents papers.
Respondent realizes there exists as much chance of winning any Motion in this Biased Court
(unless a Virtual Person) as Appalachian St. has of beating Michigan, and as a Subway
Motorman, Respondent is aware of being Railroaded. Nevertheless, without options, hope
springs eternal, and Respondent prays for Remedy/Relief aforesaid.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that pursuant to CPLR §2214(b) Time for service of notice
and affidavits. A notice of motion and supporting affidavits shall be served at least eight days
before the time at which the motion is noticed to be heard. Answering affidavits shall be served at
least two days before such time.


To: Norris McLaughlin & Marcus, P.A. Dated & sent by fax June 10, 2007 by:
875 Third Avenue
18th Floor 145 east 23rd street #4R
New York, NY 10022 NY, NY 10010
Phone:(212) 808-0700
Fax: (212) 808-0844
To whom it may concern:
Attached "Notice of Petition & Petition" taped to my door Friday morning (June 8, 2007) is/are
defective, without required signature. I ________________, respondent in proposed
action, request cure of NoP&P defects and correct legal service. Thank you.
Sincerely,
______________
, Tenant
145 east 23rd street #4R
New York, NY, 10010
Rule 2101. Form of papers. (a) Quality, size and legibility. Each
paper served or filed shall be durable, white and, except for summonses,
subpoenas, notices of appearance, notes of issue, orders of protection,
temporary orders of protection and exhibits, shall be eleven by eight
and one-half inches in size. The writing shall be legible and in black
ink. Beneath each signature shall be printed the name signed. The
letters in the summons shall be in clear type of no less than
twelve-point in size. Each other printed or typed paper served or filed,
except an exhibit, shall be in clear type of no less than ten-point in
size.
(c) Caption. Each paper served or filed shall begin with a caption
setting forth the name of the court, the venue, the title of the action,
the nature of the paper and the index number of the action if one has
been assigned. In a summons, a complaint or a judgment the title shall
include the names of all parties, but in all other papers it shall be
sufficient to state the name of the first named party on each side with
an appropriate indication of any omissions.
(d) Indorsement by attorney. Each paper served or filed shall be
indorsed with the name, address and telephone number of the attorney for
the party serving or filing the paper, or if the party does not appear
by attorney, with the name, address and telephone number of the party.
(e) Copies. Except where otherwise specifically prescribed, copies,
rather than originals, of all papers, including orders, affidavits and
exhibits may be served or filed. Where it is required that the original
be served or filed and the original is lost or withheld, the court may
authorize a copy to be served or filed.
(f) Defects in form; waiver. A defect in the form of a paper, if a
substantial right of a party is not prejudiced, shall be disregarded by
the court, and leave to correct shall be freely given. The party on whom
a paper is served shall be deemed to have waived objection to any defect
in form unless, within two days after the receipt thereof, he returns
the paper to the party serving it with a statement of particular
objections.
(g) Service by electronic means. Each paper served or filed by
electronic means, as defined in subdivision (f) of rule twenty-one
hundred three, shall be capable of being reproduced by the receiver so
as to comply with the provisions of subdivisions (a) through (d) of this
rule.

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